Motive attribution and the moral politics of the welfare state by Anthony Kevins (7308500) et al.
Motive Attribution and the Moral Politics of
the Welfare State
ANTHONY KEVINS∗ , ALEXANDER HORN∗∗ , CARSTEN JENSEN∗∗∗ AND
KEES VAN KERSBERGEN∗∗∗∗
∗School of Governance, Utrecht University, Bijlhouwerstraat 6, 3511, ZC Utrecht,
The Netherlands
email: a.v.kevins@uu.nl
∗∗Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Bartholins Allé 7,
Building 1331, Rm. 113, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
email: ahorn@ps.au.dk
∗∗∗Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Bartholins Allé 7,
Building 1340, Rm. 227, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
email: CarstenJ@ps.au.dk
∗∗∗∗Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Bartholins Allé 7,
Building 1340, Rm. 229, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
email: kvk@ps.au.dk
Abstract
This article explores the moral politics of the welfare state and the social conflicts that
underlie them. We argue that existing research on the moralism of redistributive and social
policy preferences is overly one-dimensional, with a longstanding concentration on attitudes
toward welfare state beneficiaries. To widen our understanding of the phenomenon, we intro-
duce the concept of motive attribution: that is, how people answer the question “what drives
others to take the positions that they hold?” Doing so allows us to shift the subject of moralistic
attitudes, with a move toward uncovering what citizens think of those who hold a given social
policy stance. The article then lays out a first systematic overview of motive attributions using
an original dataset built from nationally representative surveys conducted in ten Western
democracies. Comparing responses across these countries, we draw out important cross-
national differences in ascribed motives, including within welfare state regime types.
Keywords: welfare state; redistribution; public opinion; Western Europe; United States
Introduction
In the wake of the Great Recession, redistribution has become an increasingly
polarizing issue. Fiscal conservatives advocate austerity and a roll-back of the
welfare state, while others want the government to reduce economic inequalities.
Yet to fully understand the depth of this social conflict, it is not enough to simply
observe that citizens hold opposing opinions. As research on social and affective
polarization makes clear (e.g. Iyengar and Westwood, ; Mason, ), it is
equally important to realize just how morally charged the conflict between those
on either side of the redistributive fault-line is. One manifestation of this would
Jnl Soc. Pol. (2020), 49, 1, 145–165 © Cambridge University Press 2019. This is an Open Access article, distrib-
uted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),
which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited. doi:10.1017/S0047279419000175
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279419000175
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 31 Jan 2020 at 09:08:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
be the attribution of negative motives to those either favouring or opposing
redistribution.
We therefore argue that to better our understanding of the moral politics of
the welfare state, we must go beyond a focus on preferences and investigate what
we termmotive attribution: that is, how people answer the question “what drives
others to take the positions that they hold?” We do so using ten original survey
questions designed to assess how respondents evaluate other citizens’ redistrib-
utive preferences. Do they think wanting more redistribution is an expression of
self-interest, altruism, jealousy, beliefs in fairness, or laziness? Do they see oppo-
sition to redistribution as an expression of concern for the economy, status
maintenance, or dislike of the poor?
By examining the motives citizens ascribe to their pro- and anti-redistribu-
tion compatriots, we aim to provide new insights into welfare state attitudes and
debates. As we argue below, existing research on the moralism surrounding
redistributive and social policy preferences is surprisingly narrow in focus, with
a longstanding concentration on fairness norms and deservingness perceptions,
in particular vis-à-vis the poor (e.g. Sahar, ; van Oorschot, ). Thus,
although moralistic attitudes have been shown to have a variety of important
consequences – ranging from greater political engagement to increased hostility
and intolerance (e.g. Ryan, ; ; Skitka et al., ) – our understanding
of the topic is exceedingly one-dimensional.
Studying motive attributions offers a valuable route to widening this under-
standing. Key here is the shift in the subject of moralistic attitudes: while past
work has almost exclusively focused on perceptions of welfare state beneficiaries
(e.g. Jensen and Petersen, ; van Oorschot, ), we take a much broader
focus, aiming to uncover what citizens think of those who hold a given stance
toward the welfare state. Doing so has the potential to help us better understand
not only social animosity, but also social policy preferences. On the one hand,
research on social polarization (e.g. Mason, , ) suggests that motive
attributions are likely to both reflect and structure the way that individuals relate
to people whose preferences differ from their own; from this perspective, nega-
tive motive attributions could be considered a manifestation of social polariza-
tion with the potential to further entrench animosity. On the other, social
relations are themselves a potentially important factor shaping preferences
(e.g. Green et al., ): one’s thoughts about the sorts of people who take
pro- and anti-welfare state positions likely combine with self-conceptions to
help shape opinions; and the more negative motive attributions are, the less
likely individuals may be to shift their own positions.
There are thus good reasons to think that motive attributions should matter
as both an independent and dependent variable. The focus of this first look at
the concept, however, is necessarily narrow. Taking our cue from the extensive
body of research debating the effects of social policy design on public opinion
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(cf. Arts and Gelissen, ; Jæger, ; Kevins, ; Laenen, ), this arti-
cle homes in on the potential role of welfare state regimes (see Esping-Andersen,
; Scruggs and Allan, ) in shaping motive attributions. To conduct this
investigation, we rely on data from original, nationally representative surveys
that we fielded in  Western democracies – Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States – to a total of over   respondents.
The analysis of these data is guided by two questions: to what extent are
motive attributions stable across diverse contexts; and to what extent do differen-
ces in motive attributions reflect welfare state types? Our major findings are two-
fold. First, there is substantial variation across the different motives: respondents
generally ascribe more benign motives to those favouring redistribution and more
negative ones to those opposing it. Second, there is sizeable cross-country varia-
tion, but that variation does not map neatly onto welfare state regime clusters.
Notwithstanding some evidence of universalist regime effects vis-à-vis certain
motives, our overall findings are suggestive of sizeable cross-national variation
in the mix of motive attributions, both within and across welfare regimes.
The concept of motive attribution and the empirical results we present add to
a burgeoning literature on welfare state attitudes. Given the potential impact
of these preferences on social policy outcomes (see Jensen, ; Soroka and
Wlezien, ), the guiding questions of this vast body of research have so far
been “Who wants what, and why?” (e.g. Blekesaune, ; Jensen, ; Kearns
et al., ; Kevins et al., ). Adding to these literatures, we hope to
demonstrate that motive attribution is an important – and, until now, overlooked
– dimension of cross-country variation that future research ought to consider.
The concept of motive attribution
While motive attribution is a new and distinct concept, we take our point of depar-
ture from the related welfare state literature on the causal attributions of poverty
(e.g. Sahar, ; Zucker and Weiner, ). The best example of this approach is
found in work on deservingness, which focuses on the causal attributions from
which moral evaluations of responsibility are drawn (e.g. Jensen and Petersen,
; van Oorschot, ): in other words, what do citizens believe causes poverty,
and how do these beliefs affect social policy preferences? In this research, the focus
is on perceptions of welfare recipients, who may or may not be seen as responsible
for their lot in life. Studies in this vein typically distinguish between three types of
attributed causes of poverty: individual (i.e. the poor are to blame for their condi-
tion); structural (i.e. something in society, such as the structure of the economy,
causes poverty); and fate (i.e. misfortune is at fault) (see Sahar, ). On the
whole, recipients are deemed less deserving of support if the need for help is
thought to be caused by a lack of effort on their part rather than by something
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beyond their control. In brief, citizens attribute certain positive and negative
qualities to benefit recipients and this, in turn, informs politically relevant moral
evaluations of deservingness.
Our focus, however, is not narrowly on perceptions of welfare recipients,
but rather extends to anyone with redistributive preferences (be they pro- or
anti-). We agree with the implicit assumption in the deservingness literature that
normative assessments of recipients can have important political consequences
– unemployment benefit cuts, for instance, seem more likely if the jobless are
viewed as undeserving (e.g. van Oorschot, ). Yet, benefit recipients are
not the only individuals subject to these sorts of evaluations; indeed, normative
assessments surrounding the welfare state are likely to be quite an extensive
phenomenon (e.g. Rowlingson and Connor, ). Redistribution is at its core
about conflict: some who have little make a claim on others who have a lot (or at
least somewhat) more. The fairness of the implied redistribution has been
intensely debated (see Jensen and van Kersbergen, ) and it is plausible that
such conflict colours assessments of other citizens as well.
There are several reasons to believe that investigating the mix of intentions
ascribed to those holding pro- or anti-redistribution stances will provide insights
that could not simply be gleaned by examining attitudes toward redistribution.
First, recent research suggests that social polarization and issue polarization
may, in fact, be relatively distinct phenomena (e.g. Mason, , ). From this
perspective, partisan and ideological identities may, under certain circumstances,
lead citizens to “grow increasingly politically rancorous and uncivil in their inter-
actions, even in the presence of comparatively moderate issue positions” (Mason,
: ). As a consequence, at both the individual- and country-level, it seems
likely that redistributive preferences may obscure variation in the level of animosity
and affective polarization (see Iyengar and Westwood, ; Iyengar et al., ).
Second and relatedly, while welfare state politics have long been recognized
to have a strong moral dimension (e.g. Curchin, ; Moon, ; Rothstein,
; Rowlingson and Connor, ), the study of moralism underlying social
policy preferences has had a surprisingly narrow focus. As highlighted above,
most such work focuses on deservingness perceptions and fairness norms
(e.g. Larsen, b; Isaksson and Lindskog, ; Sahar, ), and almost
always in relation to the poor. This is a considerable shortcoming, in particular
since moralism itself is likely to bring about its own set of effects, both positive
(e.g. greater political involvement) and negative (e.g. greater intolerance) in
nature (e.g. Ryan, , ; Skitka et al., ). As Ryan (: ) argues,
“[m]orally convicted attitudes are special because they seem to engage a distinc-
tive mode of processing: they powerfully arouse certain negative emotions,
engender hostile opinions, and inspire punitive action.” Examining the mix
of intentions assigned to pro- and anti-redistribution individuals thus provides
an opportunity to explore the degree to which moral conviction and hostility
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pervade these debates in the minds of citizens. Doing so cross-nationally, in
turn, allows us to investigate whether and to what extent these patterns vary
by country.
In embarking on this study, we define motive attribution as an individual’s
attribution of (underlying) motives to the preferences of others. In this initial
presentation of the concept, we suggest four categories of motive attribution,
all of which are ascribable to both pro- and anti-redistributive preferences:
other-regarding motives, fairness beliefs, self-interest, and personality defects.
We consider the first two motive categories to be relatively benign, whereas
the latter two – and especially personality defects – may indicate greater animos-
ity. Note that while we do not lay out an exhaustive list of potential motives in
this paper, the motive attributions discussed here provide a first cut at investi-
gating the topic and categorizing the underlying components.
Addressing our four categories in turn, other-regarding motives entail a con-
cern with other citizens, whether directly or indirectly. A person may, for instance,
favour redistribution out of a desire to help the poor, but not herself; or she may
oppose redistribution based on the belief that it will keep the economy strong, in
the process benefiting everyone in society. In highlighting a concern for others, this
is clearly a more charitable form of motive attribution. With similar connotations,
fairness beliefs refer to abstract notions of what is right (just) and wrong (unjust).
Crucially, with both of these motive categories, an individual’s pro- or anti-
redistributive preference is not attributed to personal gain, but rather to broader
concerns related to the well-being of other individuals and/or society as a whole.
Our remaining two categories have decreasingly benign connotations.
Self-interest points to an explicit and tangible benefit behind favouring or oppos-
ing redistribution. Note that the personal benefits in question do not necessarily
have to be monetary, as they may also extend to improvements in social status
more broadly; rather, the key factor is that personal gains and losses are
perceived to be central, as attributing pro- or anti-redistributive preferences
to self-interest implies that these stances are the result of rationalistic personal
utility calculations. In other words, these preferences are assumed to at least
partly reflect the living conditions of an individual (e.g. they are poor/rich
and would like to be better off/hold on to what they have).
Personality defects, in turn, refer to arbitrary or idiosyncratic shortcomings
that characterize individual persons, and are clearly the most negative of the
motive attributions we investigate. For example, an individual might be thought
to favour redistribution due to laziness (i.e. he or she is simply too lazy to work
harder, or perhaps even to work at all) or to oppose it out of a simple dislike of
the poor. To be sure, such motives are almost certainly often wrapped up with
self-interest: the imagined lazy pro-redistribution individual would likely be per-
ceived to be heavily driven by self-interest. Yet perceived personality defects seem
less likely than pure self-interest to be explained away with reference to external
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circumstances or rationality, and as a consequence they are potentially the
harshest, most hostile form of motive attribution.
There are many reasons why the mix of attributed motives are liable to vary
across countries, ranging from political discourse to real-life differences in actu-
ally-existing motives. Here we home in on one potential factor that has been the
subject of particular attention in the social policy literature: welfare state institu-
tions. Indeed, a long line of research suggests that social policy design may shape
popular opinion (e.g. Ellingsæter et al., ; Jordan, ; Kevins, ). Larsen
and Dejgaard (), for example, argue that the universal welfare model, as found
in Scandinavia, creates a sense of social affinity within the population; this, in turn,
leads to a less negative representation in public discourse of welfare recipients than
is typically found in liberal welfare states. Much of this effect is likely tied to the
universal welfare state’s most characteristic feature: in designing programmes that
benefit everyone in society, rather than simply targeting those with the greatest
need, universalist institutions pursue a “simple egalitarian strategy” rather than
a “Robin Hood” one (see Korpi and Palme, : ). The result is less arguing
about redistribution, targeting, and neediness thresholds, and more of a focus on
debating how we should develop “our” collective welfare state (e.g. Jacques and
Noël, ; Larsen, a).
Yet the existence of welfare regime effects cannot be taken for granted, espe-
cially as another strand of the literature has called into question the relevance of
welfare types for popular opinion (e.g. Arts and Gelissen, ; Jæger, ). It is
also unclear whether institutional types can help us to understand motive attribu-
tions in Continental and Southern European welfare states: both of these systems
stress the delivery of benefits along corporatist lines, with occupation and employ-
ment history typically determining entitlement (e.g. Esping-Andersen, ;
Ferrera, ); and the difference between them is often conceptualized as one
of degree, with Southern European welfare states exhibiting higher fragmentation,
placing greater emphasis on employment history, and giving a central support role
to the family unit (see Kevins, ; Naldini, ; van Kersbergen, ). We
thus might expect these welfare states to foment a compartmentalized variant
of solidarity rather than a universal one (e.g. Rothstein and Stolle, ) – but
the Continental and Southern European institutions are clearly of less a priori
relevance than either of our two other welfare state types.
Based on existing work, then, one would expect that the key regime-related
distinction here should be between universalist Scandinavia and the selectivist/
liberal Anglo countries (see Korpi and Palme, ; Rothstein, ; van
Oorschot, ), with the mix of motive attributions in corporatist and
Southern European welfare states likely falling in between these two extremes.
Our expectations can thus be summarized with three hypotheses: universalist
welfare states will be associated with a generally more benign set of motive
attributions; liberal welfare states will exhibit a more negative set; and motive
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attributions in Continental and Southern European will be more mixed than in
either the liberal or universalist countries.
To be clear, with only ten countries in our dataset we are unable to draw any
definitive conclusions about the causal relationships underlying various mixes of
motive attributions – in particular given that a variety of contextual factors are
likely to matter. Instead, our goal here is to conduct an investigatory probe cen-
tred around two questions: to what extent are motive attributions stable across
diverse contexts; and to what extent do differences in motive attributions reflect
welfare state types?
Data
To explore patterns of motive attribution, we fielded identical surveys in 
within Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, the UK, and the US. The countries were first and foremost chosen
to maximize variation in terms of welfare regimes (see Esping-Andersen,
; Ferrera, ): the UK and the US represent the so-called residual,
liberal regime type; Denmark, Norway, and Sweden represent the universal,
social-democratic type; France, Germany, and the Netherlands represent the
Continental type; and Italy and Spain represent the Southern European type.
The number of respondents per country ranges from  (in the US) to
 (in Sweden), with   respondents in total (Appendix Table  provides
a full breakdown of respondents by country). The surveys were fielded by
YouGov, a commercial polling company. Using their online panels, respondents
were quota-sampled to achieve representativeness in terms of gender, age,
geographical region (defined according to the European Union’s NUTS 
classification of regions), and education; i.e. the conventional set of socio-
demographic background variables upon which most surveys aim to obtain
representativeness. Research (in fact, directly examining YouGov) indicates that
carefully conducted online surveys yield virtually identical total survey error and
coefficient estimates to traditional telephone and mail interviews (Ansolabehere
and Schaffner, ). As a consequence, we can feel reasonably confident about
the quality of the data employed in the analysis.
Our surveys included ten questions meant to assess potential motive
attributions. The first five relate to motive attributions for pro-redistributive
preferences, while the last five address motive attributions for anti-redistributive
preferences. In each instance, respondents were asked to state their degree
of agreement with each of the five motives on an -point scale running
from “definitely not” to “maybe” to “definitely.” The first battery of items reads:
Some people want to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. Why do you think people
support such redistribution? Is it : : :
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. To help themselves
. To help the poor, but not themselves
. Because they are jealous of the rich
. Because they believe it is fair
. Because they are lazy
Reflecting the four categories laid out above, items  and  can both be tied
to self-interest: the first asks directly if people desire redistribution in order to
help themselves, whereas the third concerns their desired status (i.e. they want to
be rich too). Item  is meant to capture other-regarding motives (helping the
poor), while item  has a similarly benign focus on fairness concerns. Finally,
item  captures belief that a personality defect (i.e. laziness) drives those favour-
ing redistribution.
Respondents were then asked to repeat the procedure, this time with regard
to anti-redistribution motives:
Similarly, some people don’t want to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. Why do you
think people are against redistribution? Is it : : :
. To help themselves
. To keep the economy strong
. To protect their lifestyle and status
. Because they believe it is fair
. Because they just don’t like the poor
As with the former question battery: items  and  are meant to broadly
capture self-interest; item  assesses other-regarding motives; item  turns to
a belief in fairness; and item  looks at ascribed personality defect (i.e. brute
dislike of the poor).
Two points are worth noting at this juncture. First, all ten questions ask
respondents to attribute motives to people who do or do not “want to redistribute
wealth from the rich to the poor.” This stylized framing thus prompts respondents
to think solely about individuals falling into pro- and anti-redistribution camps;
although this is practical for a first investigation of the topic, the wording never-
theless leads us to gloss over differences in degrees of support for redistribution –
or, indeed, preferences for different types of redistribution. Second, the survey
items include several attributable motives that are, by necessity, tied explicitly
and exclusively to the rich or the poor (e.g. favouring/opposing redistribution
“to help themselves”). While it would otherwise be impossible to consider the per-
ceived role of self-interest, the downside of this approach is that we risk priming
respondents in such a way that they think only of the poor and the rich even when
reflecting upon other potential pro- and anti-redistribution motives. We return to
each of these points in the conclusion.
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Methods
The remainder of the paper lays out the empirical patterns present in the data –
with all reported analyses incorporating design weights, so as to reflect the
underlying country populations as closely as possible. We begin by first exam-
ining patterns in the overall sample, before then breaking responses down by
country. Our goal here is to highlight differences across the motive attributions,
as well as cross-country patterns in their variations. As these analyses are purely
bivariate, however, we run the risk of identifying country effects that are driven
only by compositional differences (i.e. that variation in individual-level
characteristics is driving country-level differences). We therefore conclude
the investigation by using entropy balancing alongside standard ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions to adjust for inter-sample variation. This allows us to
mitigate potential confounders and ensure the robustness of our findings.
While most of the presented analysis is straightforward, our approach to
controlling for inter-sample variation requires a more detailed description, in
particular as it entailed two distinct steps. First, we began by generating entropy
balancing weights relative to a consistent baseline country, Norway – chosen for
its common position at the extremes of the motive attribution distributions. In
creating these weights, we took into account survey design weights as well as a
variety of individual-level variables that might potentially explain variations in
motive attributions: gender; age bracket; religiosity; trade union membership;
employment status; self-placement on the income decile spectrum; self-
placement on the ideological spectrum; and having government benefits
constitute the primary source of one’s income. Second, the resultant nine sets
of generated entropy weights (one per country-pair) were applied to the survey
respondents in OLS regressions examining the effect of “treatment” – that is,
living in a given country context relative to our baseline (Norway) – for each
of the ten motive attributions. The findings of this analysis thus effectively adjust
for differences in the mean, variance, and skew of our control variables across
our cases – in the process helping us to ensure that our bivariate results reflect
country-level contextual factors rather than individual-level variation.
Analysis
We begin by presenting the general distribution of motive attributions. Figure 
plots the percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with the five potential
motives for pro-redistribution (top panels) and anti-redistribution (bottom pan-
els) stances. In doing so, it illustrates the overall distributions (left-most panels)
as well as those among leftists (centre panels) and rightists (right-most panels),
given the potential relevance of ideology for motive attributions. For these
descriptive figures, respondents are: () coded as leftist if they placed their ide-
ology between  and  on an -point scale, and rightist if they placed it between
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 and ; and () coded as disagreeing with a motive attribution if they selected
– on the -point agreement scale, and agreeing with it if they selected –.
To make it easier to visualize the distributions, we exclude the percentage that
selected the middle category () for each motive attribution – though of course
the totals always sum to  (consult Appendix Table  for additional descrip-
tive statistics). In illustrating these results, we lay out the distribution of
responses such that reading a given panel from left to right takes us from broadly
negative motive attributions to more benign ones.
Turning first to the pro-redistribution motives, we see a general trend
toward ascribing relatively charitable motivations to those who support redis-
tribution. Moving from left to right on the x-axes, we find that the proportion
agreeing that a motive applies broadly increases, while the proportion disagree-
ing generally decreases. For the sample as a whole, the largest contrast is found
on opposing ends of the figure: on the left-most point of the x-axis, we see that
only  percent of the sample agrees that people support redistribution due to
laziness, and  percent disagree; while on the right-most point, we note that 
percent of respondents agree that people support redistribution out of fairness
concerns. Yet, the trend is not unambiguous. Respondents – especially rightists
– are relatively uninclined to ascribe the “help the poor” motive, and
FIGURE . Attributed motives for pro-and anti-redistributive preferences, percentage share
overall and on the left and right.
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conservatives are more likely to suggest that laziness, jealousy, and self-interest
motivate pro-redistribution citizens.
Turning to the bottom panels of Figure , we find a strikingly different pat-
tern of motive attributions when it comes to anti-redistribution preferences. On
average, respondents appear less positively disposed toward those who oppose
redistribution, with more negative motives far more commonly ascribed than
benign ones – a pattern that is present, remarkably, among both leftist and right-
ist respondents. Within the overall sample,  percent of respondents agree that
people oppose redistribution to protect their own status, and  percent believe
they do so to help themselves. Similarly, the proportion of respondents assigning
the fairness motive is substantially lower ( percent) than was found with
regard to pro-redistribution motives ( percent). The only motive that bucks
the trend is “dislike the poor”, which generated the lowest level of agreement
within this item set. This is, admittedly, a very negative, almost aggressive state-
ment; as such, it is probably most surprising that  percent of respondents
affirmed that it was a relevant motive.
Our next step in the investigation is to examine whether there is any mean-
ingful cross-country variation in the mix of motive attributions. How universal
are the overall trends uncovered thus far? Figure  provides a first indication of
the packages of ascribed motives for pro-redistribution stances across the coun-
tries, illustrating by-country agreement per motive for each sample. (We exclude
the percentage in disagreement here for ease of visualization.) While the graphs
FIGURE . Attributed motives for pro-redistributive preferences, percentage share of
agreement by country.
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provide a general overview of the data, ultimately pointing to considerable cross-
country variation, several overarching observations seem especially noteworthy.
First, it is in the US and France – two countries with markedly different
welfare regimes – that citizens appear most inclined to ascribe less benign
motives to those who favour redistribution: most notably, respondents from
these countries were the most likely to agree that people support redistribution
because they are lazy or to help themselves. Norwegians and Danes, by contrast,
were repeatedly among the least likely to agree with these statements. Yet there is
no similar pattern with regard to “jealousy”, as all but the Southern European
countries are clustered in the  percent range (specifically, between  and 
percent). Second, despite an overall tendency toward more benign motives,
“help the poor” is rather unpopular across the entire set of countries.
Strikingly, agreement is at its lowest in Sweden ( percent), which sits alongside
Germany and the US, while it is at its highest in France ( percent). Finally, we
find that a majority of respondents in all countries believe that people support
redistribution out of fairness concerns; here again, however, it is noteworthy that
respondents in the US and France are the most sceptical about the motives of
those with pro-redistributive preferences. Figure  thus paints a picture of sub-
stantial differences between the motive attributions of respondents living in the
US and (more surprisingly) France, on the one hand, and those living in
Scandinavia (though not Sweden) on the other. Yet, this pattern holds only
when it comes to the somewhat more hostile motive attributions: that people
support redistribution to help themselves or because they are lazy.
Attributions of jealousy, by contrast, are relatively consistent across the cases.
Figure  repeats the above exercise, but for the motives thought to drive
anti-redistribution preferences. Findings suggest that the less benign motiva-
tions of “protect status” and “help themselves” are incredibly popular across
all of the cases, with agreement between  and  percent in most countries.
Only the US stands at all apart on these items – but even there about two-thirds
of respondents agreed that these motives were applicable. Cross-country varia-
tion grows substantially, however, when it comes to what is arguably the most
hostile motive, “dislike the poor”; over half of the Spanish, French, and Italian
samples felt this motivation was attributable to those holding anti-redistribution
stances, compared to less than a third of Scandinavian and Dutch respondents.
Variation on the charitable “keep the economy strong” motive is of a similar
magnitude, though here it is the Scandinavian populations that are most in
agreement: a majority of Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes agreed this motive
applied, while agreement in the Anglo, Southern European, and French samples
was situated in the thirty-percent range. Rounding out the results, we find an
even more exaggerated version of this pattern for our other benign motive,
“fairness”. Agreement on this item ranges from  percent in Denmark to a
mere  percent in France.
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Viewing Figures  and  in combination reveals some interesting cross-
country patterns. In Denmark and Norway, neither those wanting redistribution
nor those opposing it are thought of in overly negative terms – yet Swedes tend
to be more sceptical toward those with pro-redistribution stances. A similar,
though less pronounced, picture emerged for Germany and the Netherlands.
American and French respondents, by contrast, tend to assign comparatively
negative motivations to those on either side of the redistribution question, while
Britons do so only with regard to anti-redistribution motives. Finally, Southern
Europeans are relatively more likely to ascribe less benign motives to those
opposing redistribution, and less likely to ascribe them to those favouring it.
Another way to compare the mix of attributed motives across countries is to
calculate how large a proportion of respondents applied the same motive –
whether negative or benign – to those holding pro- and anti-redistribution stan-
ces. In the case of the more charitable motives, such a duality might be inter-
preted as a sign of a less hostile environment, while applying a negative motive
to both sides might indicate greater scepticism and cynicism. Limiting ourselves
to the motives that are precisely comparable, Figure  reports the percentage of
respondents agreeing that those on both sides of the redistribution debate were
motivated by a desire to help themselves or out of fairness concerns. Countries
are ordered based on the percentage of their populations that agreed that “fair-
ness” motivated both pro- and anti-redistribution individuals.
FIGURE . Attributed motives for anti-redistributive preferences, percentage share of
agreement by country.
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The findings are telling. Turning first to the fairness motive, the
Scandinavian populations appear to live up to the consensual expectations pres-
ent in some strands of the welfare state literature:  percent of Danes thought
that fairness motivated those on both sides of the redistribution debate, as did
 percent of Norwegians and  percent of Swedes. That percentage drops to
just under  percent in the UK, the US, and Spain – and to a mere  percent in
France. In the mirror image of these results, French respondents were by far
most likely to agree that both sides are motivated by a desire to help themselves
( percent). Norway and Denmark, in turn, are the two countries where this
was least likely to be the case ( and  percent respectively), followed closely
by Spain and Germany (both at  percent). Overall, these results thus seem to
reflect a broader divide between a more consensual Scandinavian cluster and a
more conflictual Anglo and French one. In keeping with our observations above,
however, Sweden occupies a rather more ambiguous, middling position – most
notably when it comes to negative motives.
It is possible, however, that the cross-country variation highlighted so far
simply reflects compositional differences in the samples. The demography of
the countries in our sample is not identical; it is well-known, for example, that
the proportion of elderly persons is higher in Italy than in the US. Similarly,
Scandinavians are both more secularized and unionized than the populations
of Southern Europe and the US. If we want to ensure that our uncovered pat-
terns are not simply artefacts of compositional differences across the cases, we
need a more robust way to test country variation.
To that end, Figure  presents the findings from the OLS regression analyses
incorporating entropy balancing weights. The columns list the motives, once
again roughly moving from more negative (on the left) to charitable (on the
FIGURE . Respondents assigning the same motive to those holding pro- and anti-
redistribution stances, percentage share by country.
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right), while the countries are separated into their respective welfare state types.
Regression coefficients are plotted with % confidence intervals and indicate
country effects on agreement with a given motive attribution (recall that answers
are on an -point scale); for example, a score of positive two for a given coun-
try-motive pair – as with Italy and the dislike the poor motive – suggests that
respondents living in that country agree that that motive is important at a level
two points higher than respondents in Norway (accounting for survey design
weights and controlling for compositional differences across the countries).
FIGURE . Balanced cross-country differences (relative to Norway) in motive attributions.
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Several observations can be drawn from this analysis. First, the findings do
indeed broadly reflect those described above: country effects are strongest for the
motives that exhibited a greater range of cross-country variation. We can there-
fore say with greater confidence that these differences are not simply the result
of underlying compositional differences across the samples, whether connected
to basic demographics, labour-market status, or even ideological leanings.
Second, the largest country effects – both for pro- and anti-redistribution pref-
erences – are typically found in the US, Southern Europe, and France. The other
Continental countries tend to nevertheless exhibit only modest differences from
Norway, whereas Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Sweden display the smallest
effects (often to the point of being statistically indistinguishable from the
Norwegian baseline).
The findings of our investigation thus suggest considerable variation in the
mix of motive attributions within and across welfare state regimes. In line with
past research highlighting the attitudinal and discursive effects of universalism
(e.g. Larsen, a; Larsen and Dejgaard, ), Norwegians and Danes tend to
ascribe more benign motives to those supporting and opposing redistribution –
yet the mix of motive attributions in Sweden is much more ambiguous.
Attitudes in the liberal welfare states of the US and the UK, in turn, are only
similar vis-à-vis the motives of those opposed to redistribution. Instead, it is
the French, not the British, who most resemble their American counterparts;
indeed, France often shows evidence of an even more conflictual context than
that found in the Anglo democracies, while the other Continental welfare states
are generally home to a less extreme mix of motive attributions. Finally,
although Italians and Spaniards are broadly less likely to assign less benign
motives, they are far less similar when it comes to other motive attributions.
Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a new way of looking at the moral politics sur-
rounding issues of income redistribution and welfare state support. To that end,
we developed and operationalized a new concept, motive attribution, which
examines how people evaluate others’ motives for supporting and opposing
income redistribution. We do so in the hopes of opening up a new and relevant
field of research on the moral dimension of redistributive politics (see Moon,
; Rothstein, ). As a result of this moral dimension, redistributive poli-
tics is often highly contentious, and we expect research on motive attribution to
help us to understand how support coalitions for and against redistributive pol-
icies might emerge, evolve, and relate (see Green et al., ; Skitka et al., ,
; Ryan, ).
The findings reported above provide a first cut at studying motive attribu-
tions, pointing out areas of both overlap and divergence cross-nationally.
     .
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279419000175
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 31 Jan 2020 at 09:08:17, subject to the Cambridge Core
Examining the mix of motive attributions in our ten countries suggests that citi-
zens on the whole tend to view anti-redistributive preferences in a more negative
light than pro-redistribution preferences. Comparing responses cross-nationally,
however, we find only limited support for the expectation that welfare state
divisions would be central to the mix of motive attributions across the cases:
in line with the literature on universalism (Jacques and Noël, ; Larsen,
a), Denmark and Norway do indeed appear to be home to a more benign
set of motive attributions – yet it is less clear that Sweden falls into the same
pattern, in particular with regard to pro-redistribution motives. At the other
end of the spectrum, it is the US and France – two countries with markedly
different welfare state regimes – that are generally associated with a more neg-
ative mix of motive attributions, while in the UK negative attributes are mainly
applied only to those holding anti-redistribution stances. Thus, despite partial
evidence of welfare state effects, in particular vis-à-vis universalism, we con-
sider these results to be more closely aligned with research highlighting
the limits of existing regime classifications (e.g. Jæger, ; Kevins and
van Kersbergen, ; van Kersbergen and Vis, ).
Several limitations nevertheless mark this initial attempt at studying motive
attributions. First, the present study has focused only on the motives ascribed to
those who do or do not “want to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor.”
Yet this stylized distinction clearly obscures meaningful differences in redistrib-
utive preferences: at least across the countries under study, preferences for redis-
tribution are more likely to be situated along a spectrum moving from more to
less than to reflect a clear dichotomy opposing those for and against. Second,
some of the listed motives (e.g. “to help themselves”) may prompt respondents
to think only (or primarily) of the rich and poor when they reflect on the other
potential motives driving those with anti- or pro-redistribution stances; conse-
quently, it is difficult to say whether a priming effect may be colouring (via
deservingness perceptions) some responses. Third and relatedly, attributing
motives to imagined individuals necessarily implies that respondents may have
different people in mind when they think about those who favour or oppose
redistribution – a risk that is especially large when we compare respondents
from different countries, as perceived differences in motives sit alongside actual
differences. Finally, the present study only considers four categories of motive
attribution. A more complete analysis would elaborate a thorough set of motive
attribution categories and discern the extent of overlap between potentially
related ones (such as self interest and personality defects).
Both the findings and limitations of the present study thus point to a
number of avenues for further research. More generally, future work on the
causes and consequences of more negative or positive motives attributions
would be particularly welcome. Research in this vein could serve to explain
cross-country patterns related not only to motive attributions, but also to a
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range of connected phenomena (e.g. polarization, redistributive preferences,
policy u-turns). What is more, to the extent that mutable contextual factors
may shape motive attributions, such research might even lay out potential policy
routes toward mitigating social tensions and partisan animosity.
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Notes
.We do so using the ebalance package (Hainmueller and Xu, ).
. Entropy balancing is a multivariate reweighting method: in brief, just as survey design
weights bring a survey sample closer in line with the target population, weights generated
from entropy balancing bring two samples – a (non-experimental) “treatment” and “con-
trol” group – closer in line with one another. This is done to assess the effects of “treatment”,
controlling for potentially important differences across the samples. In other words, entropy
balancing generates individual-level weights (for use in subsequent analyses) that account
for inter-sample variation across a set of balancing constraints (see Hainmueller, ;
Hainmueller and Xu, ).
. Figures illustrated using coefplot (Jann, ) and plotplainblind (Bischof, ).
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Appendix
APPENDIX TABLE . Number of respondents per country
Country
Number of
Respondents
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Total  
APPENDIX TABLE . Weighted descriptive statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Pro-redistribution motives
Help themselves . .  
Help the poor . .  
Jealousy . .  
Fairness . .  
Laziness . .  
Anti-redistribution motives
Help themselves . .  
Help the economy . .  
Protect their status . .  
Fairness . .  
Dislike the poor . .  
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